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State v. District Court (Jackson), 116 P.3d 834; 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 42 (Nev. 
2005)1 
 
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE -- SENTENCING 
Summary 
  
 Petitioner, seeking a writ of mandamus, contended that the district court abused its 
discretion by awarding defendant credit against her prison sentence for time served on 
house arrest as a condition of bail.2 
  
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 Petition granted.  The Nevada Supreme Court held that house arrest is not 
confinement within the meaning of NRS 176.055,3 which allows the district court 
discretion to award credit against the duration of a sentence for time “actually spent in 
confinement before conviction.”4  
 
Factual & Procedural History 
 
 On September 26, 2002, Reno Police Officer Michael Scofield was responding to 
an accident when his motorcycle collided with Defendant Jackson’s vehicle.  Officer 
Scofield died as a result of the collision. 
 A jury convicted Jackson of driving under the influence of a prohibited substance, 
resulting in death, a violation of NRS 484.3795.  Following the verdict and after posting 
bail, Jackson was placed on house arrest. 
 During sentencing, Jackson asked the district court for a house arrest credit of 297 
days, and the Division of Parole and Probation (the “Division”) informed the district court 
that Jackson was entitled to 297 days’ credit for time served.  The district court followed 
the Division’s recommendation and sentenced Jackson to serve a prison term of 24 to 96 
months with 297 days’ credit for time served. 
 
Discussion 
 
 The Division viewed “residential confinement” as “confinement” under the statute, 
but the court reasoned that allowing credit for time served in house arrest negates the 
                                                 
1 By Kenneth E. Hogan 
2 Dist. Ct. (Jackon), 116 P.3d at 834. 
3 Id. 
4 The district court’s authority to award credit for time spent in pre-sentence confinement comes from NEV. 
REV. ST. § 176.055(1) (2004), which states in pertinent part: 
Whenever a sentence of imprisonment in the county jail or state prison is imposed, the 
court may order that credit be allowed against the duration of the sentence, including any 
minimum term thereof prescribed by law, for he amount of time which the defendant has 
actually spent in confinement before conviction, unless his confinement was pursuant to a 
judgment of conviction for another offense. 
legislative intent behind NRS 176.055.  The history of the statute suggests that the 
Legislature intended to allow credit specifically for pre-sentence time spent in the county 
jail.  Citing hearings from each of three post-adoption NRS 176.055 amendments, the court 
concluded that the Legislature understood “confinement” to be synonymous with “county 
jail time.”5 
 Further, the court reasoned that allowing credit for time spent on house arrest 
would defeat the legislative intent of statutes imposing mandatory prison sentences.  Since 
Jackson had been convicted under NRS 484.3795, carrying a mandatory prison sentence, 
the court noted that “[c]learly the legislature intended for those convicted under this 
sentence to spend time in prison.”6  Further the court highlighted substantial differences 
between Jackson’s house arrest and incarceration in the county jail.  Specifically, the court 
noted that “Jackson was free to leave her home on advance notice for matters such as 
grocery shopping, employment, laundry, medical appointments, counseling, and court 
appearances . . . [and] was even permitted to travel to California to get married and to Las 
Vegas for a deposition.  Additionally, Jackson was allowed to reside in her own home and 
enjoy all of its comforts.”7 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The court concluded that Jackson’s house arrest was merely a reasonable condition 
imposed upon her release on bail, and held that house arrest does not constitute time 
“actually spent in confinement” for which the duration of a sentence may be credited 
pursuant to NRS 176.055. 
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